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Golinger: Free Speech on Private Property

COMMENT
SHOPPING IN THE MARKETPLACE

OF IDEAS:
WHY FASHIONVALLEYMALL

MEANS TARGET AND TRADER
JOE'S ARE THE NEW TOWN
SQUARES
INTRODUCTION
A "soapbox" is defined as "an improvised platform used by a selfappointed, spontaneous, or informal orator.,,1 Soapboxes have long been
recognized as symbols of the opportunity for any individual in an open
society to introduce new ideas to others. 2 Pioneering political activist
Harvey Milk famously announced his campaign for San Francisco
Supervisor while standing on an old crate labeled "SOAP" on the corner
of Castro and Market Streets. 3 But what if Harvey Milk had been told he
could not set up his soapbox and speak out on the corner where people
gathered, but instead was relegated to giving his speech in an out-of-theway alley where few people, if any, would be there to hear his words? If

I

WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2160

(\976).
2 The tenn "soapbox" was popularized in 1872 at "Speakers' Comer" in the Hyde Park
neighborhood of London. See CahaI Mirno, At the Home of the Soap-Box, There is a Lot of Froth
but Little Substance, THE INDEPENDENT UK, Nov. 5 ,2001; Leslie Jones, Hyde Park and Free
Speech, HYDE PARK SOCIALIST (No. 34, Winter 1976-77).
3 MILK (Focus Features 2008); see also Steven T. Jones, Politics Behind the Picture, SAN
FRANCISCO BAY GUARDIAN, Nov. 19,2008.
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the grassroots movement Milk sparked4 had instead sputtered, the loss
would not have been merely Milk's, because every constriction of the
free flow of ideas in American democracy harms us all.
The right to engage in free expression is merely a hollow promise if
people who choose to exercise that right are not afforded the opportunity
to speak where their words may be heard. The First Amendment to the
United States Constitution provides a foundation for the protection of
free expression in American society.5 Furthermore, some states offer
free-speech protection that is more expansive than that provided by the
U.S. Constitution. 6 Since the seminal California Supreme Court decision
of Robins v. Pruneyard, 7 California has stood at the forefront of those
states that provide state constitutional protection for free speech broader
than the First Arnendment. 8
In Pruneyard, the court held that the liberty clause of the California
State Constitution mandates that there must be sufficient places available
so that citizens who choose to exercise their free-speech rights may do so
in a meaningful way.9 The court held that the California Constitution lO
protects the right of free expression not only in the traditional public
forums of parks, sidewalks and downtown business districts, which are
the primary protected places for free speech under the First
Amendment, II but also in shopping malls and on other private property
4 When Harvey Milk won a seat on the San Francisco Board of Supervisors in November
1977, he became an instant icon as the most visible openly gay elected official in the nation. He
authored a civil rights ordinance outlawing discrimination based on sexual orientation, the strongest
such law in the nation, and opened up City Hall to citizen participation by emphasizing grassroots
politics and the power of neighborhoods. Time Magazine named Milk one of the" I 00 Heroes and
Icons of the 20th Century" as a "symbol of what gays can accomplish and the dangers they face in
doing so." Milk was killed by an assassin's bullet less than one year after taking office but his
legacy has endured and continues to inspire. See John Cloud, Harvey Milk, TIME, June 14, 1999; see
generally RANDy SHILTS, THE MAYOR OF CASTRO STREET: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF HARVEY MILK
(1982).
S U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6 See Harriet D. Milks, Annotation, Validity, Under State Constitutions, of Private Shopping
Center's Prohibitions or Regulation of Political, Social, or Religious Expression or Activity, 52
A.L.R.5th 195 (1997).
7 Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal. 3d 899 (1979), ajJ'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
8 See Harriet D. Milks, Annotation, Validity, Under State Constitutions, of Private Shopping
Center's Prohibitions or Regulation of Political, Social, or Religious Expression or Activity, 52
A.L.R.5th 195 (1997).
9 Pruneyard, 23 Cal. 3d 899.
10 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2 (a) ("Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or
abridge liberty of speech or press."); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 3 (a) ("The people have the right to
instruct their representatives, petition government for redress of grievances, and assemble freely to
consult for the common good.").
II Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939) ("The privilege ofa citizen of
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that has largely replaced the gathering places of old. This became known
as the "Pruneyard Doctrine.,,12
However, in the three decades since Pruneyard, questions have
been raised about the scope, and even the viability, of the Pruneyard
Doctrine in the modern era.13 The California Supreme Court added to
the perception that Pruneyard was being narrowed when it held that the
liberty clause does not protect the right of tenants to engage in freespeech activity in private apartment buildings. 14 Moreover, California
appellate court decisions have utilized an increasingly restrictive
interpretation of the Pruneyard court's analysis of what kind of private
property is a public forum that is constitutionally required to allow freespeech activities. '5
In late 2007, the California Supreme Court directly answered some
of the questions raised in the decades since Pruneyard was first decided.
This Note asserts that in Fashion Valley Mall v. NLRB the court put to
rest the concerns about Pruneyard's continued viability. This Note
explains that in Fashion Valley Mall, for the first time since the
California high court decided Pruneyard nearly thirty years earlier, the
court directly affirmed the notion that the California Constitution's
liberty clause protects the right to free-speech activities on private
property, such as a large shopping mall, that has taken on the
characteristics of a traditional downtown business district. 16 This Note
further asserts that the majority's opinion in Fashion Valley Mall
requires a different approach from that taken by the state appellate courts
in deciding whether "stand-alone stores" such as Target and Trader Joe's
also qualify as public forums where free-speech activity is
constitutionally protected.
the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views ... must not, in the guise
of regulation, be abridged or denied.").
12 Pruneyard, 23 Ca1.3d at 910 ("We conclude that sections 2 and 3 of article I of the
California Constitution protect speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers
even when the centers are privately owned.").
13 See generally Curtis 1. Berger, Pruneyard Revisited: Political Activity on Private Lands,
66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 633 (1991); Gregory C. Sisk, Uprooting the Pruneyard, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 1145
(2007).
14 See Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass'n, 26 Cal. 4th 1013 (2001).
15 See Trader Joe's Co. v. Progressive Campaigns, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 4th 425 (1999)
(initiative petition signature gathering could be prohibited by Trader Joe's on its property because
the signature gatherers failed to provide evidence that the Trader Joe's store had supplanted the
town's central business district as the preferred place people chose to come to meet and spend time
with one another); see also Van v. Target Corp., ISS Cal. App. 4th 1375 (2007) (signature gatherers
failed to prove the entrance area of a retail store functioned as a public forum); Albertson's, Inc. v.
Young, 107 Cal. App. 4th 106 (2003) (signature gatherers failed to prove a grocery store was the
functional equivalent of a traditional public forum).
16 Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. NLRB, 42 Cal. 4th 850 (2007).
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Part I will provide a brief background of the public forum doctrine,
the California Constitution's liberty clause and the key California cases
in this area oflaw. Part II will analyze the status of Pruneyard in light of
Fashion Valley Mall and explore how lower courts currently determine
whether private property qualifies as a constitutionally protected freespeech area. Finally, Part III will explain that the current analysis being
used by appellate courts overly restricts the number of places that are
available for free-speech activities. Following Fashion Valley Mall,
courts should now presume that free-speech activities on private property
that the owner has voluntarily opened to the public are constitutionally
protected. Courts should place the burden of proving that free-speech
activities would interfere with the use of their property on those property
owners who wish to prohibit free-speech activities.
I.

THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION PROTECTS PLACES FOR
FREE SPEECH: FROM THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE TO
FASHION VALLEY MALL

To enhance the discussion of Fashion Valley Mall, a review of basic
free-speech law and the U.S. Supreme Court's public forum doctrine will
be provided. Next, the California Constitution's liberty clause and the
seminal decision of the California Supreme Court applying free-speech
protection to private property, Pruneyard, will be discussed. This
section will also present state court decisions since Pruneyard that have
adopted an increasingly narrow definition of "public forum." Finally,
this section will set forth the facts and procedural history of Fashion
Valley Mall.
A.

THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE

The freedom of speech is widely considered the most fundamental
freedom because it is protective of all others. 17 If the government or
other powerful forces should seek to constrain a citizen from practicing
her preferred religion, raising her family as she sees fit, or exercising her
right to be left alone, it is the freedom of speech that allows the citizen to
call attention to her plight and rally others to her defense. 18 Without the
17 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964); see also Stromberg v. Cal., 283
U.S. 359, 369 (1931) ("The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end
that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by
lawful means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of
our constitutional system.").
18 See Whitney v. Cal., 274 U.S. 357,375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J. concurring) ("Those who
won our independence believed that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol39/iss2/5

4

Golinger: Free Speech on Private Property

2009]

FREE SPEECH ON PRIVATE PROPERTY

265

right to speak freely and be heard by others, each citizen would be left
alone to fend for herself against the powers that be. 19 As U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo characterized it, free speech is "the
indispensable condition of nearly every other freedom.,,20
To express a message in a manner that actually reaches others
requires more than just permission to speak - it requires places for that
speech to actually occur. However, most people do not have the
resources to buy billboards, pay for mass mailings, or place their own ads
in the newspaper, on television or on Google. 21 While mass-media
communication is by far the most effective way of reaching large
numbers of people, one-on-one dialogue provides an avenue for "cheap
speech" that everyone can afford. 22 Moreover, particularly in the context
of smaller neighborhood quality-of-life issues and local elections, inperson conversations provide the opportunity for meaningful dialogue
and two-way interaction. This can produce a "participatory politics" that
advances ideas and understanding far beyond what one-way
advertisements can achieve.23 However, to ensure that meaningful inperson dialogue is a real possibility and not merely nostalgia for a
bygone era, citizens must have access to physical locations that provide
fundamental principle of the American government. They recognized the risks to which all human
institutions are subject. But they knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of
punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that
fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the
path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies;
and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as
applied through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law-the argument of force in its
worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the
Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed."), overroled on other grounds,
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
19 Id.; see also Buckley v. Val eo, 424 U.S. I, 14 (1976) ("Discussion of public issues and
debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government
established by our Constitution.").
20 Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937), overruled on other grounds, Benton v. Md., 395
U.S. 784, 794 (1969).
21 For example, even during an economic downturn, the average cost of airing a single 30second television commercial in prime time during the 2007-2008 season was estimated at $130,089.
Brian Steinberg, Price of a 30-Second TV Spot Slumps 4. I%, ADVERTISING AGE, Oct. 6, 2008.
22 Owen M. Fiss, Why the State, 100 HARV. L. REv. 781, 792 (1987) (discussing the need for
the state to playa role in providing access to the general public to mass media outlets and other
outlets for effective political expression but also asserting that what one of his colleagues called
"cheap speech" is a necessary, albeit not sufficient, component of protected expression).
23 BENJAMIN BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE,
151, 154-55 (1984) ("Strong democracy is defined by politics in the participatory mode: literally, it
is self-government by citizens rather than representative government in the name of citizens ....
Participatory politics deals with public disputes and conflicts of interest by subjecting them to a
never-ending process of deliberation, decision, and action .... At the moment when 'masses' start
deliberating, acting, sharing, and contributing, they cease to be masses and become citizens.").
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them with the opportunity to share ideas with others. 24
The U.S. Supreme Court initially refused to recognize any
constitutional right to use property - public or private - for free-speech
purposes. 25 But in a pair of decisions in 1939 the Court changed course
and recognized the right to use at least some kinds of public property for
free-speech activities: "Wherever the tide of streets and parks may rest,
they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and,
time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions. ,,26 The Court thus articulated what became known and widely
accepted as the "public forum doctrine," characterizing government
property such as sidewalks and parks as "public forums" that the
government is constitutionally obligated to make available for freespeech activities. 27 Later, the Court also considered, but ultimately
rejected, claims that the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution also
requires that private property that has taken on the characteristics of a
public forum must be made available for free-speech activities. 28
However, the Court also held that nothing in the U.S. Constitution bars
states from adopting stronger protections for free speech in their state
constitutions. 29
B.

BROADER SPEECH PROTECTIONS IN THE CALIFORNIA
CONSTITUTION

On a quiet Saturday afternoon in 1978, a group of high-school
students set up a card table in the corner of the courtyard at a mall in
Campbell, California. 3o The mall was the privately owned Pruneyard
24 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1342 (2d ed. 2005) ("Speech often
requires a place for it to occur. Most people lack access to the mass media - television, radio,
newspapers - to express their message. They need to have a place to distribute leaflets or a comer to
place a soapbox.").
2S Davis v. Mass., 167 U.S. 43 (1897) (holding that a Massachusetts citizen did not have a
constitutional right to make a public address in the public park known as the "Boston Common").
26 Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939); see also Schneider v. N.J.,
308 U.S. 147 (1939).
27 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1348 (2d ed. 2005).
28 See Marsh v. Ala., 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan
Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968), abrogated by Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972);
Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518 (1976) ("[W]e make clear now, ifit was not clear before, that
the rationale of Logan Valley did not survive the Court's decision in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner.").
29 PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83-84 (1980), cited with approval in
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434 (1982); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Pub. Uti I. Comm'n, 475 U.S. I, 12 (1986) (plurality); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 393
(1994).
30 Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal. 3d 899, 902 (1979), ajJ'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
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Shopping Center, a 21-acre facility open to the public with 65 shops, 10
restaurants, a cinema and a central courtyard. 31 The group of students
had chosen to give up part of their weekend to work for a cause they
believed in - they arrived at the Pruneyard Mall to collect signatures on a
petition to the President of the United States supporting Israel and
objecting to a United Nations resolution against Israeli "Zionism.,,32
Soon after the students set up their card table, laid out their
clipboards, and began asking passersby for a moment of their time, a
private mall security guard approached the students and told them to
leave. 33 Although by all accounts the students had been peaceful and
apparently well-received by mall patrons, the mall ordered them to leave
because of a blanket policy prohibiting free-speech activity inside the
mall. 34 The students complied with the guard's request and left the
mall. 35 Then the students filed a lawsuit. 36 The result was the 1979
California Supreme Court decision of Pruneyard. 37 Four years earlier,
the California Supreme Court had observed that the state's free-speech
clause was "more definitive and inclusive than the First Amendment.,,38
But in Pruneyard, the court for the first time explicitly held that this
meant the California Constitution's liberty clause protects the right to
free speech not only in public places but also on private property that has
adopted the characteristics of a public forum. 39
The Pruneyard court engaged in a balancing test, weighing the
rights of the property owner to control his property against the societal
interest in access to valuable places for free-speech activity.40 The court
first reasoned that, since individual property rights must yield to the
public interest in a variety of areas such as land use and environmental
needs, the same must be true for the equally strong public interest in
311d.
32ld.

331d.
34 Id.
("Pruneyard's policy is not to pennit any tenant or visitor to engage in publicly
expressive activity, including the circulating of petitions, that is not directly related to the
commercial purposes.").
3S Id. at 903.
361d. at 902.
37 Pruneyard, 23 Cal. 3d 899, ajJ'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (explicitly recognizing states'
authority to enact speech protections broader than those in the U.S. Constitution).
38 Wilson v. Super. Ct., I3 Cal. 3d 652, 658 (I975) (noting that, unlike the U.S. Constitution,
which characterizes the First Amendment right to free speech as a limit on Congressional power "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech," the California Constitution
empowers every person with an affirmative right to free speech without qualification or reference to
the state).
39 Pruneyard, 23 Cal. 3d at 908.
40 Id. at 903-10.
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protecting the constitutional right of freedom of speech. 41 Then the court
assessed the expansion of private shopping malls in modem life. 42 The
court noted that private shopping malls had increasingly displaced
traditional downtown business districts as shopping venues. 43
Consequently, the court recognized that downtown business districts had
become less valuable as outlets for the expression of ideas. 44 In his
dissent in an earlier case, Justice Stanley Mosk detailed the rapid growth
of private shopping centers in recent years: "Increasingly, such centers
are becoming 'miniature downtowns'; some contain major department
stores, hotels, apartment houses, office buildings, theatres, and
churches.,,45 Relying on the words of Justice Mosk, the Pruneyard
majority concluded:
His observations on the role of the [shopping] centers in our society
are even more forceful now than when he wrote. The California
Constitution broadly proclaims speech and petition rights. Shopping
centers to which the public is invited provide an essential and
invaluable forum for exercising those rights. 46

C.

THE "PRUNING OF PRUNEYARD,,47

In the wake of Pruneyard, high courts in five other states Colorado, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Oregon and Washington eventually followed California's lead in interpreting their state
constitutions to protect at least some free-speech activities in privately
41 Id. at 905-06 ('To hold otherwise would flout the whole development of law regarding
states' power to regulate uses of property and would place a state's interest in strengthening First
Amendment rights in an inferior rather than a superior position. '[All] private property is held
subject to the power of the government to regulate its use for the public welfare.'" (citation
omitted»; see also Agric. Lab. ReI. Bd. v. Super. Ct., 16 Cal. 3d 392, 403 (1976) (noting that for 50
years it had already been well established that the right to individual control over private property
was subordinate to the general welfare when the two collided).
42 Pruneyard, 23 Cal. 3d at 907.
43Id.
44 Id. at 910; see also JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN ClTlES 4
(Vintage Books 1992) (1961) (vividly describing the abandonment of downtowns for the suburbs
due to a combination of planning, political and economic decisions, with the resulting disappearance
of those traditional public gathering places that are so vital to the life of any healthy community).
4sDiamond v. Bland, II Cal. 3d 331,342 (1974) (Mosk, J., dissenting), overruled by
Pruneyard, 23 Cal. 3d at 910.
46 Pruneyard, 23 Cal. 3d at 910.
41 See Alan E. Brownstein & Stephen M. Hankins, Pruning Pruneyard: Limiting Free
Speech Rights Under State Constitutions on the Property oj Private Medical Clinics Providing
Abortion Services, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1073 (1991) ("The authors support the pruning of
Pruneyard. not the uprooting and overruling of its interpretation of the state constitution.").
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owned shopping centers. 48 However, two major developments occurred
in the three decades since Pruneyard was decided that generated
confusion about both its scope and validity. First, the California
Supreme Court decision in Golden Gateway Center v. Golden Gateway
Tenants Assn.,49 while not addressing Pruneyard's core holding,
appeared to contradict Pruneyard's underlying rationale and fueled
commentators' questioning of Pruneyard's wisdom and even its vitality
as good law. 50 Second, a series of appellate court decisions over the last
decade significantly narrowed the scope of Pruneyard. The appellate
courts held that stand-alone stores such as Trader Joe's, Albertson's, and
Target are not covered by the Pruneyard doctrine, thus allowing those
stores to entirely ban free-speech activities from their property.51
1.

Golden Gateway

In the two decades following Pruneyard, the California Supreme
Court did not directly address its central holding, leaving the precise
scope of protection provided by California's liberty clause an open
question. 52 Then in 2001, the high court in Golden Gateway held that the
liberty clause in the California Constitution did not protect the right of a
tenants' association to distribute its newsletter under the apartment doors
48 Bock v. Westminster Mall, 819 P.2d 55 (Colo. 1991); Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l,
Inc., 455 N.E.2d 590 (Mass. 1983); N.J. Coal. Against War in the Middle E. v. J.M.B. Realty Corp.,
650 A.2d 757 (N.J. 1994); Lloyd Corp. v. WhitTen, 849 P.2d 446 (Or. 1993), abrogated by
Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., II P.3d 228, 243 (Or. 2000); Alderwood Assocs. v. Wash. Envtl.
Council, 635 P.2d 108 (Wash. 1981); see also Harriet D. Milks, Annotation, Validity, Under State
Constitutions, of Private Shopping Center's Prohibitions or Regulation of Political, Social, or
Religious Expression or Activity, 52 A.L.R.5th 195 (1997) (also noting that courts in ten states Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South
Carolina and Wisconsin - have declined to find speech protected in shopping malls).
49 Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass'n, 26 Cal. 4th 1013 (2001).
50 See Gregory C. Sisk, Uprooting the Pruneyard, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 1145, 1212 (2007) ("in
sharp institutional and methodological contrast with Pruneyard, the [Golden Gateway] court
carefully examined the text, history, and structure of the California Constitution, finding no basis for
imposing constitutional obligations upon private citizens."); see also Harry G. Hutchison, Through
the Pruneyard Coherently: Resolving the Collisions of Private Property Rights and Nonemployee
Union Access Claims, 78 MARQ. L. REv. I (1994); Frederick W. Schoepflin, Speech Activists in
Shopping Centers: Must Property Rights Give Way to Free Expression?, 64 WASH. L. REV. 133
(1989).
51 See Van v. Target Corp., 155 Cal. App. 4th 1375 (2007) (retail store could prohibit freespeech activity at the entrance of its store); Albertson's, Inc. v. Young, 107 Cal. App. 4th 106 (2003)
(grocery store could ban signature gathering); Trader Joe's Co. v. Progressive Campaigns, Inc., 73
Cal. App. 4th 425 (1999) (store not violating free-speech rights by prohibiting initiative petition
signature gathering because Trader Joe's was not a public forum).
52 Golden Gateway, 26 Cal. 4th at 1016 ("Since [Pruneyardj, courts and commentators have
struggled to construe [Pruneyardj and determine the scope of protection provided by California's
free speech clause.").
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in its residential complex over the objections of the landlord. s3 The court
detenmned that the exclusionary character of a private apartment
complex made it significantly different from places that voluntarily open
their doors to the public. s4 The court found that it was this intention to
exclude, rather than invite, the general public that disqualified the
apartment complex from being a public forum under Pruneyard. ss
The Golden Gateway plurality also took the opportunity to criticize
Pruneyard generally. The court noted that the Pruneyard court had been
"less than clear" about the scope of the liberty clause's application to
private property and exactly what kind of property was affected. s6 The
court also pointed out that Pruneyard failed to address "the threshold
issue of whether California's free-speech clause protects against only
state action or also private conduct."s7 Finally, the Golden Gateway
court noted that Pruneyard had simply provided "little guidance on how
to apply it outside the large shopping center context."S8
The Golden Gateway court completed its Pruneyard critique by
pointing out that "most of our sister courts interpreting state
constitutional provisions similar in wording to California's free-speech
provision have declined to follow [Pruneyard]."S9 The court listed
numerous decisions that had been critical of Pruneyard. 60 While the
court stopped short of directly challenging Pruneyard's validity, it
appeared to do so only because it was "obliged to follow it under the
principles of stare decisis.,,61 Although the court did not say it was yet
prepared to overrule Pruneyard,62 the consequence of Golden Gateway
53Id. at 1022.
Id.
55 Id. at 1033 ("Here, the Complex is privately owned, and Golden Gateway, the owner,
restricts the public's access to the Complex. In fact, Golden Gateway carefully limits access to
residential tenants and their invitees. Thus, the Complex, unlike the shopping center in [Pruneyardj,
is not the functional equivalent of a traditional public forum."); id. at 1039 (George, C.J.,
concurring) ("[TJhere is no state or federal constitutional right to distribute unsolicited pamphlets in
a location (whether publicly or privately owned) not open to the general public, such as the closed
interior hallways of the apartment buildings here at issue.").
56 !d. at I 021 (plurality opinion).
57Id.
58Id.
54

Golden Gateway, 26 Cal. 4th at 1020.
Golden Gateway, 26 Cal. 4th at 1020-22 n.S (listing the court cases from states that
declined to follow Pruneyard, pointing out that many of them had been sharply critical of
Pruneyard).
61 Golden Gateway, 26 Cal. 4th at 1020-22.
62 One reason Justice Brown, writing for the plurality, may have stopped short of a frontal
challenge to Pruneyard here was that the fifth vote for the judgment, Chief Justice George, distanced
himself in his concurrence from broader efforts to rein in Pruneyard. See Golden Gateway, 26 Cal.
4th at 1036 (George, C.J., concurring).
59

60
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was that it created doubt about whether California's liberty clause would
continue to protect free-speech activity on private property.63

2.

State Appellate Decisions on Stand-Alone Stores

Recent California appellate court decisions have provided a further
indication of Pruneyard's tenuousness. Over the last several years, three
different California state appellate courts addressed the issue of whether
California's liberty clause protects free-speech activity on the property of
stand-alone stores such as supennarkets and large retail stores. 64 In each
case, the appellate courts concluded that the free-speech activity was not
protected. 65
In Trader Joe's Company v. Progressive Campaigns, Inc., the First
District Court of Appeal held that a free-standing supennarket's interest
in controlling its private property outweighed society's interest in being
able to use the sidewalk in front of the store to gather signatures on ballot
initiative petitions. 66 Employing the Pruneyard analysis to balance the
competing interests of the property owner against those of society, the
court concluded that the Trader Joe's store had not voluntarily assumed
the character of a public forum. The court emphasized the limited nature
of what the Trader Joe's store had invited the public to do on its
premises: "Trader Joe's invites people to come and shop for food and
food-related items. It does not invite them to meet friends, to eat, to rest
or to be entertained. Indeed, citizens are not invited to 'congregate' at
the Santa Rosa Trader Joe's.,,67 The court contrasted this with the
decision of the owners of a shopping mall to offer dedicated courtyards,
plazas and seating areas in which people could sit and discuss anything
from shopping to civic matters. 68 This, the court found, demonstrated
that "Trader Joe's interest in maintaining exclusive control over its
63 Gregory c. Sisk, Uprooting the Pruneyard, 38 RUTGERS LJ. 1145, 1213 (2007) ("While
declining to overrule Pruneyard for reasons of stare decisis, the Golden Gateway Center plurality
nonetheless undermined the argument for transportation of constitutional rights to the private sector
by holding that California's constitutional Liberty of Speech Clause does indeed protect only state
action .... While the obsolete Pruneyard decision thus has been deprived of much of its precedential
and all of whatever analytical support it ever had, the shattered ruin nonetheless remains a
jurisprudential attractive nuisance for deformed constitutional interpretation.").
64 See Van v. Target Corp., 155 Cal. App. 4th 1375 (2007); Albertson's, Inc. v. Young, 107
Cal. App. 4th 106 (2003); Trader Joe's Co. v. Progressive Campaigns, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 4th 425
(1999).
65 Target, 155 Cal. App. 4th 1375; Albertson's, 107 Cal. App. 4th 106; Trader Joe's, 73 Cal.
App. 4th 425.
66 Trader Joe's, 73 Cal. App. 4th 425.
67 [d. at 433.
68 [d.
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private property is stronger than the interest of a shopping mall.,,69
As for society's need to use the Trader Joe's as a forum for
gathering signatures, leafleting or other speech activity, the court
concluded that society's interest was not very strong. 70 While many
people may gather at the store, the court emphasized that there were no
facts showing that people were doing so for the purpose of interacting
with one other: "[T]hose people come for a single purpose-to buy
goods .... [T]he Santa Rosa Trader Joe's is not a public meeting place
and society has no special interest in using it as such.,,71 The court
reasoned that private property does not obtain a "public character" when
the public visits it for a narrow purpose rather than for a variety of
reasons that could potentially include engaging in political discourse or
getting educated about the issues of the day. 72
In further support of its conclusion, the court asserted that the
plaintiffs arguing for greater speech protections had failed to meet their
evidentiary burden. 73 In the view of the Trader Joe's court, the
Pruneyard court had been able to reach its conclusion only after seeing
"tangible evidence that shopping centers were supplanting central
business districts as the preferred public forum.,,74 In contrast, the
Trader Joe's court concluded that, since the plaintiffs in that case had
presented no such evidence, the court had no basis upon which it could
fmd that the Santa Rosa Trader Joe's qualified as a constitutionally
protected public forum. 75
Similarly, in Van v. Target Corp and Albertson's, Inc. v. Young, the
Second District Court of Appeal and Third District Court of Appeal,
respectively, rejected free-speech claims. 76 In each case citizens asserted
that they had the right to engage in political activity by registering
citizens to vote and gathering voter signatures on ballot petitions while
standing in front of large stand-alone stores. 77 Like the Trader Joe's
court, these courts concluded that, in the context of stand-alone stores,
the balance between society's free-speech interests and private property
rights favored the rights of property owners to prohibit free-speech
691d.
701d.
711d.

Trader Joe's, 73 Cal. App. 4th at 434.
Id.
741d.

72

73

75 Id. ("In contrast [to Proneyard], in the present case there is absolutely no evidence in any
of appellants' declarations that the Santa Rosa Trader Joe's has assumed a comparable role.").
76 See Van v. Target Corp., 155 Cal. App. 4th 1375 (2007); Albertson's, Inc. v. Young, 107
Cal. App. 4th 106 (2003).
77 Target, 155 Cal. App. 4th 1375; A/benson's, 107 Cal. App. 4th 106.
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activity on their land. 78
D.

THE CALIFORNIA HIGH COURT SPEAKS: FACTS AND
PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF FASHION VALLEY MALL

It was another incident in a shopping mall twenty years after
Pruneyard that prompted the state high court to define the

constitutionally protected places for free speech in modern-day
California. On October 4, 1998, approximately forty members of the
Graphics Communications International Union, Local 432-M, entered
the Fashion Valley Mall. 79 The union members began distributing
leaflets to customers of the Robinsons-May retail store criticizing the
store for advertising in the San Diego Union-Tribune newspaper, which
was engaged in a labor dispute. so Mall officials appeared and told the
union members to leave the property and informed them that they were
trespassing since mall policy prohibited any kind of activity that urged
customers not to patronize one of its stores. S! The union members
initially protested. However, after a police officer arrived, the union
members moved to public property at the entrance of the Mall, where
they briefly distributed additionalleaflets. 82
Eleven days later, the union filed a complaint with the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB) alleging that the Fashion Valley Mall
had violated the National Labor Relations Act83 by prohibiting the union
members from distributing leaflets inside the mall. 84 An administrative
law judge found for the union. 85 The judge ruled that the mall's rules
78 Albertson 's, 107 Cal. App. 4th at 121 ("A location will be considered a quasi-public forum
only when it is the functional equivalent of a traditional public forum as a place where people choose
to come and meet and talk and spend time. The evidence does not establish that the Albertson's
store is such a place."); Target, 155 Cal. App. 4th at 1390 ("We decline to extend the holding in
Pruneyard to the entrance and exit area of an individual retail establishment within a larger shopping
center. . .. In view of the undisputed evidence that those particular areas lacked any public forum
attributes, the trial court properly concluded that any societal interest in using respondents' stores as
forums for exercising expressive activities did not outweigh respondents' interest in maintaining
control over the use of their stores.").
79 Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. NLRB, 42 Cal. 4th 850, 855 (2007).

8°Id.
81

Id. at 856.

821d.
83 The National Labor Relations Act provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an
employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees" in the exercise of certain rights, including
"the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations ... and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining." 29 V.S.C.A. §§ 157, 158(a)(I)
(Westlaw 2009), quoted in Fashion Valley Mall, 42 Cal. 4th at 855 n.l.
84 Fashion Valley Mall, 42 Cal. 4th at 854.
85Id. at 855.
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prohibiting consumer boycotts on mall property violated the National
Labor Relations Act. 86 The NLRB later affirmed the administrative law
judge's decision. 87
Subsequently, Fashion Valley Mall petitioned for review of the
NLRB decision before the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit. 88 The court of appeals issued an opinion on June
16, 2006, stating that it had to decide whether the mall's prohibition of
boycott activity violated the National Labor Relations Act and, if so,
whether California law empowered the mall to enforce such a
prohibition. 89 Since the court concluded that the answer to the first
question was 'yes,' the outcome of the case turned on the answer to the
second question. 9o Recognizing that this second question involved an asyet-undecided issue of California law, the court of appeals requested that
the California Supreme Court decide whether California law allowed the
mall to enforce an anti-boycott rule on its premises. 91
The California high court granted review. 92 In a decision issued on
December 24, 2007, the California Supreme Court held that California
law prohibited Fashion Valley Mall from enforcing its anti-boycott
rule. 93 By a 4-3 majority, accompanied by a vigorous dissent, the court
concluded that California's Constitution extended broad free-speech
protections to the private property of Fashion Valley Mall, thereby
affirming the Pruneyard doctrine as good law. 94
86

Id. at 856.

On October 29, 2004, the NLRB issued an opinion, relying in part on Pruneyard, that
affinned the administrative law judge's decision. stating: "California law pennits the exercise of
speech and petitioning in private shopping centers, subject to reasonable time, place, and manner
rules adopted by the property owner. [The rule at issue here], however, is essentially a contentbased restriction and not a time, place, and manner restriction permitted under California law. That
is, the rule prohibits speech 'urging or encouraging in any manner' customers to boycott one of the
shopping center stores .... [I]t appears that the purpose and effect of this rule was to shield [the
Mall]'s tenants, such as the Robinsons-May departtnent store, from otherwise lawful consumer
boycott handbilling. Accordingly, we find that [the Mall] violated Section 8(a)(I) .... " Fashion
Valley Mall, 42 Cal. 4th at 856.
88 Fashion Valley Mall, 42 Cal. 4th at 857.
87

89Id.
9() Id.
91Id. ("The court of appeals [for the District of Columbia Circuit] observed that 'no
California court has squarely decided whether a shopping center may lawfully ban from its premises
speech urging the public to boycott a tenant"').
92Id. at 857.
93Id. at 869-70.
94 The court's primary holding was that the mall's rule was a content-based restriction on
speech that must be subjected to strict scrutiny, a test that the mall's rule failed. "The Mall's
purpose to maximize the profits of its merchants is not compelling compared to the Union's right to
free expression." Fashion Valley Mall, 42 Cal. 4th at 869-70. However, to reach that conclusion the
Court first afftrmed that the right to free speech extended to the interior of a private shopping mall.
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THE MEANING OF FASHION VALLEY MALL: EXTENDING
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION TO FREE-SPEECH
ACTIVITY AT STAND-ALONE STORES

The consequence of Fashion Valley Mall to the body of law
concerning places for free speech in California will be two-fold. First,
the state high court's unequivocal affirmation of the Pruneyard
doctrine9s will put to rest questions about the continued viability of
constitutional protection for free speech on private property in California.
The court's holding will be seen as a rejection of claims that Pruneyard
is an unconstitutional infringement on private property rights and that it
is an outdated doctrine from an overly activist 1970's jUdiciary.96
Second, by so squarely endorsing the necessity of places for protected
speech, Fashion Valley Mall will encourage lower courts to apply
constitutional free speech protections to private property beyond
shopping malls. 97 In doing so, this Note asserts, the reasoning of
Fashion Valley Mall dictates that those courts should employ the
"interference test," an analysis that presumes speech is protected, rather
than unprotected. 98 Each of these ideas will be discussed in tum.
A.

FASHION VALLEY MALL CLEARLY AFFIRMED THE
PRUNEYARD DOCTRINE

The Pruneyard decision made California the first state in the nation
to find that its state constitution extended the reach of its free-speech
clause to protect speech activity in private shopping centers. 99 This
provided significantly greater free-speech protection than the federal
constitution, which protects speech activity only on government

In doing so the Court thereby directly affinned Pruneyard as good law based on its merits, rather
than merely due to adherence to stare decisis, for the first time since Pruneyard was originally
decided.
9S Fashion Valley Mall, 42 Cal. 4th at 870.
96 See generally Frederick W. Schoepflin, Speech Activists in Shopping Centers: Must
Property Rights Give Way to Free Expression?, 64 WASH. L. REv. 133, 145 (I989); Gregory C.
Sisk, Uprooting the Pruneyard, 38 RUTGERS LJ. 1145, 1146 (2007).
97 Fashion Valley Mall, 42 Cal. 4th at 870.
98 The basis of the "interference test" was articulated by the court in In re Hoffman, 67 Cal.
2d 845 (I 967}.
99 Josh Mulligan, Finding a Forum in the Simulated City: Mega Malls, Gated Towns, and the
Promise of Pruneyard, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'y 533,550 (2004) (noting that California was
the first state in the nation to recognize a right to free speech in private shopping malls under its state
constitution after the U.S. Supreme Court in Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (l976) held such a
right did not exist under the U.S. Constitution).
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property. 100 This "groundbreaking decision" 101 generated controversy.
Pruneyard came under assault and was characterized as an infringement
on private property rights that was unconstitutional under prior U.S.
Supreme Court decisions. 102 Others simply criticized Pruneyard as
activist judicial policy-making that would fail the test of time. 103
However, a unanimous decision by the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed
Pruneyard. The Court held that nothing in the federal constitution or
prior U.S. Supreme Court decisions limited "the authority of[a] State to
exercise its police power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own
Constitution individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by
the Federal Constitution."I04
While California courts followed Pruneyard, its critics never went
away. Two main lines of criticism have shadowed Pruneyard since its
inception: 1) that it was an unconstitutional infringement on private
property rights, and 2) that it was the result of a temporarily activist
judiciary and no longer relevant in modem times. 105 In light of the fact
that the California Supreme Court had never directly affirmed

Hudgens, 424 U.S. 507.
Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass'n, 26 Cal. 4th 1013, 1016 (2001)
(describing Pruneyard as "a groundbreaking decision").
102 Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal. 3d 899, 911 (1979) (Richardson, J.,
dissenting) ("The majority relegates the private property rights of the shopping center owner to a
secondary, disfavored, and subservient position vis-a-vis the 'free speech' claims of the plaintiffs.
Such a holding clearly violates federal constitutional guarantees announced in Lloyd Corp. v.
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972)."), ajJ'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); see also Frederick W. Schoepflin, Speech
Activists in Shopping Centers: Must Property Rights Give Way to Free Expression?, 64 WASH. L.
REv. 133, 153 (1989) (describing the continued viability of Pruneyard as "suspect" in light of recent
U.S. Supreme Court decisions requiring the government to compensate private property owners for
taking their land for use by others).
10) Harry G. Hutchison, Through the Pruneyard Coherently: Resolving the Collisions of
Private Property Rights and Nonemployee Union Access Claims, 78 MARQ. L. REv. 1,44 (1994)
(characterizing Pruneyard's impact as an attack on "justice, equity, and coherence"); Gregory C.
Sisk, Uprooting the Pruneyard, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 1145, 1146 (2007) ("This judicially-fashioned free
speech right to trespass on private property found no support in the language, structure, or history of
the California Constitution. Indeed, other than a perfunctory quotation of the pertinent clause with
no further analysis of the language, the California Supreme Court did not pause in its policy-making
zeal to consider text, context or history. In sum, Pruneyard 'appears to be more a decision of desire
than analytical conviction. "').
104 PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980). Moreover, the Court also
rejected both the mall's claims that restricting its right to exclude citizens who wish to speak to
others was a Fifth Amendment violation as a taking of their property without just compensation and
a Fourteenth Amendment violation of the mall's guarantee against the deprivation of property
without due process oflaw.
lOS See Pruneyard, 23 Cal. 3d at 914 (Richardson, 1., dissenting) ("A private shopping owner
is protected by the federal Constitution from unauthorized invasions by persons who enter the
premises to conduct general 'free speech' activities unrelated to the shopping center's purposes and
functions.").
100

101
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Pruneyard, both of these critiques gained traction over time. 106
Following Golden Gateway and the state appellate decisions restrictively
applying Pruneyard it appeared that Pruneyard was on the way to
becoming "obsolete.,,107 However, by directly affinning Pruneyard in
unqualified tenns, the high court in Fashion Valley Mall implicitly
rejected further challenges to Pruneyard's vitality. lOS
1.

Pruneyard is not an unconstitutional infringement on private
property rights

The primary criticism of Pruneyard is that by requiring that freespeech activities be allowed on private property it violates property rights
protected under the federal Constitution. 109 The crux of this argument is
that to deny property owners the right to exclude persons from their
property infringes on the prohibition against government deprivation of
property without due process of law in violation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 11O A related argument is that if the government
requires free-speech activities on private land, it has engaged in a
"taking" of private property for public use as defined by the Fifth
Amendment. If a taking has occurred, under the Fifth Amendment the
government must provide just compensation to the property owner. III

106 See, e.g., Harry G. Hutchison, Through the Pruneyard Coherently: Resolving the
Collisions of Private Property Rights and Nonemployee Union Access Claims, 78 MARQ. L. REv. I
(\994); Gregory C. Sisk, Uprooting the Pruneyard, 38 RUTGERS LJ. 1145 (2007).
107 Gregory C. Sisk, Uprooting the Pruneyard, 38 RUTGERS LJ. 1145, 1213 (2007)
(describing the effect of Golden Gateway on Pruneyard as depriving it of all of its analytical
strength and most of its precedential value).
108 Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. NLRB, 42 Cal. 4th 850, 870 (2007).
109 See Pruneyard, 23 Cal. 3d at 914 (Richardson, J., dissenting); John A. Ragosta, Free
Speech Access to Shopping Malls Under State Constitutions: Analysis and Rejection, 37 SYRACUSE
L. REv. I (\ 986); Frederick W. Schoepflin, Speech Activists in Shopping Centers: Must Property
Rights Give Way to Free Expression?, 64 WASH. L. REv. 133 (\ 989).
110 See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 552-53 (1972) ("We granted certiorari to
consider petitioner's contention that the decision below violates right of private property protected
by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."); see also Frederick W. Schoepflin, Speech Activists in
Shopping Centers: Must Property Rights Give Way to Free Expression?, 64 WASH. L. REv. 133,145
(\ 989) ("The most basic common law property right is the right to exclusive possession. Property
owners are generally free to choose who may use their property, when, and for what purposes.
Persons who have been invited onto private property become trespassers if they refuse to leave when
requested to do so. Persons with permission to be on land for a limited purpose become trespassers
when their activities exceed the scope of their invitation. State common law and statutory property
rights define the scope of property rights protected under the Constitution. The constitutional right
of an owner to control the use of property should not be denied in favor of a competing right that is
not based on the Constitution or other federal law.").
III See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,831 (1987); Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2009

17

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 5

278

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

However, the U.S. Supreme Court specifically declined to find a
violation of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment in Pruneyard. 112
Nevertheless, the property-rights critique of Pruneyard gained traction
because the California Supreme Court for thirty years following
Pruneyard declined to affirm that the balance between free-speech rights
and private property rights favored speech. I 13
The majority in Fashion Valley Mall closed the door on the property
rights challenges to Pruneyard by unequivocally stating that
constitutional free-speech protections extend to free-speech activity on
private property: "A shopping mall is a public forum in which persons
may reasonably exercise their right to free speech guaranteed by article I,
section 2 of the California Constitution.,,1l4 In doing so, the court walked
through a detailed history of how it had respected both state and federal
constitutional rights in balancing property rights with free-speech
needs. I 15 Acknowledging the private property rights argument, the
Fashion Valley Mall court reiterated that such an argument had failed
thirty years earlier and would fail again today since requiring a shopping
mall to allow free-speech activity did not "unreasonably impair the value
or use of their property as a shopping center." I 16
By articulating the foundation of the Pruneyard doctrine so directly,
112 PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83-84 (1980) ("Here the requirement
that appellants permit appellees to exercise state-protected rights of free expression and petition on
shopping center property clearly does not amount to an unconstitutional infringement of appeJlants'
property rights under the Taking Clause .... There is also little merit to appellants' argument that
they have been denied their property without due process oflaw.").
113 Gregory C. Sisk, Uprooting the Pruneyard, 38 RUTGERS LJ. 1145, 1205 (2007) ("The
greatest rebuttal to the policy advocates of transplanting free speech rights into the foreign soil of the
private sector lies in the impossibility of carefully controlling the spread of this alien vegetation into
new fields of private human endeavor once it has taken root."); see also Julian N. Eule & Jonathan
D. Varat, Transporting First Amendment Norms to the Private Sector: With Every Wish There
Comes a Curse, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1537,1564-1565 (1998) (characterizing Pruneyard as a "radical
departure" from traditional respect for private property rights).
114 Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. NLRB, 42 Cal. 4th 850, 869-70 (2007).
lIS [d. at 858-63.

116 Fashion Valley Mall, 42 Cal. 4th at 863 (quoting PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447
U.S. at 83). This entire line of argument against Pruneyard is strikingly similar to the claim that
"economic substantive due process" rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are infringed
by government regulation of businesses. That doctrine, known as "Lochnerism" after Lochner v.
N. Y., 198 U.S. 45 (1905), held sway for a time in the early twentieth century but was resoundingly
rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Pa"ish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)
(upholding a state law that required a minimum wage for female employees). See also ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 545 (2d ed. 2005) ("Since 1937, not one state or federal
economic regulation has been found unconstitutional as infringing liberty of contract as protected by
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court has made it clear that
economic regulations - laws regulating business and employment practices - will be upheld when
challenged under the Due Process Clause so long as they are rationally related to a legitimate
government purpose."). Nevertheless, this line of attack on Pruneyard has persisted.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol39/iss2/5

18

Golinger: Free Speech on Private Property

2009]

FREE SPEECH ON PRIVATE PROPERTY

279

the Fashion Valley Mall court explicitly rejected the critiques of
Pruneyard as an unconstitutional taking of private property. The
Fashion Valley Mall court's affirmation is all the more powerful because
it lacked any of the caveats that the Golden Gateway plurality used when
adhering to Pruneyard due to principles of stare decisis. I 17
2.

Pruneyard remains relevant and necessary

Pruneyard's critics have also engaged in a political assault on the
decision, attempting to characterize it as an outdated doctrine that was
the product of a radical judiciary that prioritized social policy-making
over respect for the Constitution. I IS This criticism of Pruneyard
appeared to find favor in the Golden Gateway plurality, which described
in great detail the large number of state courts that had rejected a similar
interpretation of their own state constitutional free-speech clauses in the
years since Pruneyard. 119 In so doing, the Golden Gateway plurality
suggested it may well have come to the exact opposite conclusion of the
Pruneyard court had the issue been addressed for the first time under
modem conditions rather than decades earlier. 120
However, in directly affirming the application of Pruneyard to keep
shopping malls open to free-speech activity in 2007 and beyond, the
Fashion Valley Mall majority left little room for this line of criticism to
credibly persist. The court noted the importance of keeping California's
broad constitutional free-speech protections intact in the twenty-first
century: "For the California Constitution is now, and has always been, a
117 See Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass'n, 26 Cal. 4th 1013, 1022
(2001) ("Nonetheless, [Pnmeyard] has been the law in California for over 20 years. Whether or not
we would agree with [Pruneyard's] recognition of a state constitutional right to free speech in a
privately owned shopping center if we were addressing the issue for the first time, we are obliged to
follow it under principles of stare decisis.").
118 See Gregory C. Sisk, Uprooting the Pruneyard, 38 RUTGERS LJ. 1145 (2007) ("The
Pruneyard decision should be recognized as the anachronistic product of a transitory era in
American legal history during which the courts openly assumed powers to advance preferred social
policies through the venue of constitutional litigation, untethered to the words of a constitutional
charter or the historical setting in which those words were given legal force. . .. Pruneyard is a
weed in the garden of constitutional jurisprudence. Pruneyard should be shorn off at the roots, lest
its noxious vegetation crowd out the growth of a healthier approach to constitutional
interpretation."); see also John A. Ragosta, Free Speech Access to Shopping Malls Under State
Constitutions: Analysis and Rejection, 37 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1 (1986); Frederick W. Schoepflin,

Speech Activists in Shopping Centers: Must Property Rights Give Way to Free Expression?, 64
WASH. L. REv. 133 (1989).
119
120

Golden Gateway, 26 Cal. 4th at 1020-22 n.5.
Golden Gateway, 26 Cal. 4th at 1022 ("Whether or not we would agree with [Pruneyard's]

recognition of a state constitutional right to free speech in a privately owned shopping center if we
were addressing the issue for the first time, we are obliged to follow it under the principles of stare
decisis.").
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'document of independent force and effect particularly in the area of
individual liberties. ",121 The court observed in Fashion Valley Mall that
private property has continued to "replace the streets and sidewalks of
the central business district" as gathering places for citizens and thus
venues for free speech. 122 The Fashion Valley Mall court extensively
traced the cases finding constitutional protection for free speech on
private property, spending nearly half of the opinion detailing those
decisions and their rationales. 123 In doing so, the California court
indicated that its affirmation of Pruneyard was deeply rooted in
precedent and principles that remained both relevant and necessary.
B.

A POST-FASHION VALLEY MALL APPROACH TO WHETHER
PRIVATE PROPERTY QUALIFIES AS A PUBLIC FORUM:
THE INTERFERENCE TEST

By affirming Pruneyard, the Fashion Valley Mall court embraced
the overarching principle that "[the] California Constitution provides
greater, not lesser, protection for ... free speech.,,124 However, the court
did not have the opportunity to settle the looming question of when, or
whether, that speech protection applies to venues other than shopping
125
malls.
That is a question the Pruneyard court left unsettled and lower
courts have struggled with ever since. 126
Justice Chin, writing for the three Fashion Valley Mall dissenters,
attempted to convert the majority's silence regarding the scope of the
constitutional protection into a pronouncement limiting the public forum
doctrine only to large shopping malls and not to individual stores:
"Today's majority opinion carefully says nothing casting doubt on the
recent cases involving stand-alone stores, and they are surely correct.,,12?

121 Fashion Valley Mall, 42 Cal. 4th at 863 (quoting Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons, 24 Cal.
4th 468, 49 I (2000)).
122 Jd. at 858.
123 Nearly seven pages of the fifteen-page majority opinion were devoted to recounting the
cases applying the public forum doctrine to private property under California's Constitution.
Fashion Valley Mall, 42 Cal. 4th at 858-64.
124 Fashion Valley Mall, 42 Cal. 4th at 868.
125 The owners of Fashion Valley Mall did not directly challenge the notion that they were
constitutionally required to allow free-speech activities on their property, challenging only the extent
of that constitutional requirement and whether it prohibited the mall from imposing particular
restrictions on speech activity. Fashion Valley Mall, 42 Cal. 4th at 858.
126 See Trader Joe's Co. v. Progressive Campaigns, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 4th 425, 433 (1999)
("Pruneyard establishes that there is a state constitutional right to exercise free speech and
petitioning activity on private property. However, the Pruneyard court did not purport to articulate
the precise scope of that right. ").
127 Fashion Valley Mall, 42 Cal. 4th at 880 (Chin, J., dissenting).
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But there is every reason to believe that the Fashion Valley Mall majority
knew exactly what it was doing when it wholeheartedly embraced
Pruneyard: opening the door to new approaches to preserving places
where free speech can thrive in today's world. By issuing an unqualified
affirmation of Pruneyard, 128 the high court indicated that protecting
places for speech remains as necessary now as it was thirty years ago.

1.

There is a need for new public forums for free speech because large
individual stores have replaced giant indoor shopping malls as
gathering places

In a series of cases over the last decade, California appellate courts
have declined to protect citizens' right to engage in free-speech activity
on the property of large stand-alone stores. 129 There is a fundamental
problem with this result. Large stand-alone stores, either as the anchors
of open air strip-malls or operating on their own, have increasingly
replaced Pruneyard-era enclosed shopping malls as places where citizens
come into contact with others. 130 The courts need to acknowledge this
shift by recognizing that the entrances to stand-alone stores should be
considered public forums that must be made available for free-speech
activity.
The Pruneyard court relied heavily on evidence in the record
demonstrating that there had been a massive shift in recent decades away
from shopping in the traditional downtown business districts in favor of
shopping in large shopping malls. l31 Among the evidence the Pruneyard
court considered were statistics demonstrating that retail sales in central
San Jose had dropped so dramatically that the downtown business district
only accounted for five percent of the county's total retail sales. 132
Nearly thirty years after Pruneyard, there has been a similar shift away
Fashion Valley Mall, 42 Cal. 4th at 870.
See Van v. Target Corp., ISS Cal. App. 4th 1375 (2007); Albertson's, Inc. v. Young, 107
Cal. App. 4th 106 (2003); Trader Joe's, 73 Cal. App. 4th 425.
130 See generally David Segal, Our Love Affair With Malls Is On The Rocks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
I, 2009, at BI (,There are roughly 1,500 malls in the United States, according to the International
Council of Shopping Centers, many of them ailing, some of them being converted into office
buildings, and others closing their doors for good. At Web sites like deadmalls.com, the carcasses of
these abandoned buildings are photographed and toe-tagged, along with tributes from former
shoppers."); The Mall Pall: Have America's Biggest Shopping Centers Lost Their Allure?,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON,
Dec.
10,
2008,
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edularticle.cfm?articleid=2111 (last visited Mar. 8, 2009).
131 Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal. 3d 899, 907 (1979), ajJ'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
132 Id. ("Retail sales in the central business district declined to such an extent that statistics
have not been kept since 1973. In 1972 that district accounted for only 4.67 percent of the county's
total retail sales.").
.
128

129
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from enclosed large shopping malls to open-air strip malls and standalone stores. 133 Individual "big-box" stores have increasingly attracted
busy shoppers who are no longer willing to spend whole afternoons
wandering around the various stores inside large malls to find the right
place to make their purchase. 134 According to the International Council
of Shopping Centers, today less than five percent of shopping centers in
the U.S. are enclosed malls.13S
As the venues that have supplanted the small town business districts
of old as the places people today gather to shop, meet, and talk, it is
inconsistent for the courts to continue to treat large stand-alone stores
such as Trader Joe's and Target differently from enclosed shopping malls
in terms of free-speech access. 136 One appellate justice recently noted
that it is the responsibility of the courts to reconcile the gap between the
theory of free speech and the reality of ensuring opportunities for people
to speak where their messages can be heard:
It is anomalous to declare that a shopping center may constitute a
public forum and then to exclude from that domain the sidewalks in
the vicinity of the anchor business where most people go-the
supermarket. It does sponsors of an initiative little good to be able to
set up their table on the edge of a parking lot where they have, at best,
minimal access to citizens on their way to shop in the supermarket. 137

Just as changes in the fabric of society led the Pruneyard court to
recognize the need for new protected gathering places for free-speech
activities, a new wave of changes in the marketplace has reshaped the
map of where people congregate today.138 Fashion Valley Mall provides
133 See Tenisha Mercer, Aging Malls Fight to Remake Their Images, THE DETROIT NEWS,
Mar. 3, 2005, at Al ("Years ago, avid shoppers like Janet Thomas flocked to places such as
Northland Center, which launched the nation's indoor mall craze 50 years ago. Developers built
malls as fast as they could and retailers of all sizes clamored to open up shops inside them.
America's love affair with malls decimated many of its downtowns. But the winds are shifting
again, and this time it's malls that are endangered as department stores consolidate and consumers
increasingly choose stand-alone stores and Main Street-style open-air shopping plazas.").
134 See Kortney Stringer, Abandoning the Mall, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 2004, at B I (major
retailers increasingly opening stand-alone outlets to appeal to busy customers while shuttering stores
located inside malls).
135 International
Council
of
Shopping
Centers,
Industry
Fun
Facts,
hnp:/lwww.icsc.org/srchiabout/impactofshoppingcenters/02_DidYouKnow.pdf (last visited Mar. 8,
2009).
136 See Van v. Target Corp., 155 Cal. App. 4th 1375 (2007); Albertson's, Inc. v. Young, 107
Cal. App. 4th 106 (2003); Trader Joe's Co. v. Progressive Campaigns, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 4th 425
(1999).
137 Albertson's, 107 Cal. App. 4th at 132 (Sims, J., concurring).
138 Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal. 3d 899 (\979), ajJ'd, 447 U.S. 74 (\980).
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the opportunity for California courts to take the next logical step. They
should acknowledge that, since large indoor shopping malls have been
significantly replaced by individual stand-alone stores as gathering
places, those stand-alone stores represent new locations that must be
recognized as protected public forums for free-speech activities.
2.

The prevailing analysis for whether private property qualifies as a
public forum creates an improper presumption that citizen speech is
not protected anywhere other than malls

The Fashion Valley Mall court considered the application of freespeech protections to a large-scale shopping mall that did not contest that
it was constitutionally required to allow at least some expressive activity
on its property.139 Therefore, the state's high court did not need to
determine whether constitutional free-speech protections applied, an
inquiry that balances the interests of the individual property owner
against society's interests in conducting free-speech activities on the
particular property.140 However, the appellate courts that have been
called upon to do so have applied this balancing of interests test in a way
that effectively creates a heavy presumption against protecting citizen
speech. 141
In rejecting attempts by citizens to register voters and collect
petition signatures outside of retail stores, appellate courts have made
their decisions based on the presumption that speech activities are not
constitutionally protected in a given place unless "the property owner has
so opened up his or her property for public use as to make it the
functional equivalent of a traditional public forum.,,142 The primary
factors considered by the courts in determining whether this presumption
can be rebutted and the private property rises to the level of a public
forum are 1) the extent of the invitation by the property owner to the
public, 2) the nature of the primary use of the property, 3) any
relationship between the speech activities and the primary use of the
property, and 4) the size of the business. 143 Some courts have also
Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. NLRB, 42 Cal. 4th 850, 858 (2007).
140 Trader Joe's, 73 Cal. App. 4th at 433.
141 See Target, 155 Cal. App. 4th 1375 (signature gatherers failed to prove the entrance area
of a retail store functioned as a public forum); Albertson's, 107 Cal. App. 4th 106 (signature
gatherers failed to prove a grocery store was the functional equivalent of a traditional public forum);
Trader Joe's, 73 Cal. App. 4th 425 (signature gatherers failed to provide evidence that the Trader
Joe's store had supplanted the town's central business district as the preferred place people chose to
come to meet and spend time with one another).
142 Albertson's, 107 Cal. App. 4th at 118 (citing Trader Joe's, 73 Cal. App. 4th 425).
143Id. at 119; see also Planned Parenthood v. Wilson, 234 Cal. App. 3d 1662, 1671 (1991).
139
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considered the public's interest in using the particular piece of private
property as a venue for free speech. l44 In each case, the courts have
concluded that private property smaller than a mall is not a public
forum. 145
Pruneyard specifically declined to make the size of the premises a
determinative factor in the public forum balancing test. 146 While the
appellate courts acknowledged this, they nevertheless gave heavy weight
to the fact that individual stores are vastly different from large shopping
malls. 147 Individual stores, even large ones, inherently offer far fewer
products than a gigantic mall and have significantly less space to make
available for the public to interact with one another. Primarily
examining the purpose of property owners in inviting the public to their
property or the purpose of the public in visiting the property, to see if
either had a "public character" to it, the appellate courts have been
careful not to describe the physical size of the property as the dispositive
factor in the public forum determination. 148 However, by focusing on the
number of uses the property owner offers to the public, the appellate
courts have in effect made size the determinative factor in the public
forum analysis since, by their nature, individual stores can offer many
fewer uses to their visitors than large, multi-store malls. 149
While acknowledging that the size of the private property is not the
determinative factor, the recent appellate court decisions nevertheless
have concluded that, in the balance between free speech and property
rights, stores smaller than massive malls are not required to allow freeTrader Joe's, 73 Cal. App. 4th at 433.
[d.; Target, 155 Cal. App. 4th 1375; Albertson's, 107 Cal. App. 4th 106.
146 Albertson's, 107 Cal. App. 4th at 119 ("Pruneyard did not hold that free speech and
petitioning activity can be exercised only at large shopping centers or that such activities can be
exercised on any property except for individual residences and modest retail establishments. [citation
omitted] The size of the business is simply a factor to be weighed in balancing the competing
interest of the owner and society-'[t]he smaller the business, the more weight the owners' rights
will have .... (quoting Allred v. Shawley, 232 Cal. App. 3d 1489, 1496 (199\)).
147 See Trader Joe's, 73 Cal. App. 4th at 433, where the court stated that it was not hinging
public forum status on the size of the property but effectively did just that by describing size as the
critical factor.
148 Trader Joe's, 73 Cal. App. 4th at 434 ("Trader Joe's opens its property to the public so the
public can buy goods. It does not offer its property for any other use. Thus, in contrast to Pruneyard
and other multipurpose shopping centers, the Santa Rosa Trader Joe's does not have a 'public
character. "').
149 The dispositive effect of the size of the venue on the public-forum analysis was strikingly
evident in Slevin v. Home Depot, 120 F. Supp. 2d 822, 834 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (concluding that a
twelve-person seated area outside a stand-alone store's main exit, which the store itself characterized
as a "Public Forum Area" in a posted sign, was not protected for free-speech activity, since the area
was not the "hub of activity envisioned in Pruneyard, which involved a 21 acres shopping center
housing some 65 shops, 10 restaurants, and a cinema").
144

145
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speech activities. 150 This analysis of whether private property qualifies
as a public forum effectively presumes that free-speech activity is not
protected on private property other than large shopping malls.
Particularly in light of Fashion Valley Mall, it is clear that this analysis
fails to enforce the vigorous free-speech protections required by
California's Constitution. 151

3.

The proper test for whether private property is a public forum is
whether free-speech activities would unreasonably interfere with
the primary use of the property

Until now, California appellate courts have largely declined to
extend constitutional protection to citizens who attempt to exercise their
speech rights on private property smaller than large malls. However, the
Fashion Valley Mall court held that the California Constitution's liberty
clause continues to require that citizens be allowed to exercise their right
to free speech on private property.152 The appellate courts should take
the next logical step and apply the Pruneyard balancing test to put the
burden of proof on the party who wishes to restrict speech, rather than on
citizens wishing to speak. In doing so, the courts would facilitate
constitutionally protected free-speech activity rather than discouraging it.
The right of private property owners to exclude others is inherently
circumscribed by their voluntary decision to open their venues to the
general public. 153 In the case of a large retail store, "access by the public
is the very reason for its existence.,,154 These property owners impliedly
accept as part of the cost of doing business that, in exchange for
benefiting from having the public to come onto their premises, they must
accommodate the public's reasonable needs. 155 That bargain does not
entirely deprive the property owner of the basic rights to "the exclusive

150 Target, 155 Cal. App. 4th 1375; Albertson's, 107 Cal. App. 4th 106; Trader Joe's, 73 Cal.
App. 4th 425.
151 Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. NLRB, 42 Cal. 4th 850, 870 (2007).
IS2Id.

IS) In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 217-18 (1970) ("The shopping center may no more exclude
individuals who wear long hair ... who are black, who are members of the John Birch Society, or
who belong to the American Civil Liberties Union, merely because of these characteristics or
associations, than may the City of San RafaeL").
154 Lombard v. La., 373 U.S. 267, 275 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring).
155 See Schwartz-Torrance Inv. Corp. v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers' Union, 61 Cal. 2d
766,771 (1964) ("[T]he countervailing interest which plaintiff endeavors to vindicate emanates from
the exclusive possession and enjoyment of private property. Because of the public character of the
shopping center, however, the impairment of plaintiff's interest must be largely theoretical. Plaintiff
has fully opened his property to the public."); see also In re Lane, 71 Cal. 2d 872,878 (1969).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2009

25

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 5

286

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

possession and enjoyment of private property."IS6 However, the decision
of a property owner to voluntarily open his doors to benefit from public
access is intertwined with the responsibility of respecting the public's
constitutionally guaranteed rights. ls7
Property owners should bear the burden of justifying to a court why
they should be allowed to require citizens to leave their constitutional
rights at the door. The legal analysis of whether a particular private
property constitutes a public forum should begin from the presumption
that the speech activity is protected and place the burden of proving
otherwise on the property owner wishing to restrict free-speech activities.
The courts should start from the premise that California's free-speech
protections should apply to any private property that has been made
"freely and openly accessible to the public.,,158 Courts should place the
burden of proving that a particular property is not a public forum on the
property owner who wishes with one hand to benefit from inviting the
public onto their land but with the other to deny citizens their right to
communicate with one another about the issues of the day.
The Fashion Valley Mall court articulated the proper test for
whether private property qualifies as a public forum in its recitation of its
holdings in In re Lane and In re Hoffman. 159 In In re Lane, the state high
court described the threshold inquiry for whether free-speech protections
apply to a particular piece of private property as one that simply asks
whether the owner has invited the public to patronize its store and in so
doing has allowed the public to freely traverse the sidewalk or walkway
in front of its store. 160 If that is the case, then the court asks whether
permitting the free-speech activities would unreasonably interfere with
the owner's primary use of the property.161 If there is no unreasonable
interference from the free-speech activities, the property owner cannot

116 Schwartz-Torrance, 61 Cal. 2d at 771. The court in Fashion Valley Mall was clear that the
owner of private property that qualifies as a public forum retains the ability to impose reasonable
time, place, and manner restrictions on speech activities to ensure they do not conflict with the
primary use of the property. These can include a wide variety of restrictions, such as the
requirement of a cleaning deposit if leaflets are to be distributed, prohibitions on the use of
loudspeakers, limits on the location where the speech activities may be conducted, and a cap on the
number of people who are conducting speech activities on the premises at any given time. Fashion
Valley Mall, 42 Cal. 4th at 863-65.
Il7 See In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 217-18 (1970).
Il8 Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass'n, 26 Cal. 4th 1013, 1033 (2001).
Il9 In re Lane, 71 Cal. 2d 872; In re HotTman, 67 Cal. 2d 845 (1967).
160 In re Lane, 71 Cal. 2d at 878.
1611d. (UIn utilizing the [private] sidewalk for such purposes those seeking to exercise such
rights may not do so in a manner to obstruct or unreasonably interfere with free ingress or egress to
or from the premises.").
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completely exclude them from the property. 162
The court's application of this "interference test" in In re Hoffman
is instructive. There, the high court held that Vietnam War protesters
had the right to hand out leaflets in a privately owned train station in Los
Angeles as long as the free-speech activity did not interfere with the
legitimate conduct of railroad business. 163 The court first noted that the
three railroad companies that owned the train station generally invited
the public onto their premises, making it accessible without restriction. 164
Then the court examined whether the free-speech activities of leafleting
and talking with train patrons impeded the primary use of the railroad
station, finding that they did not:
Those activities in no way interfered with the use of the station. They
did not impede the movement of passengers or trains, distract or
interfere with the railroad employees' conduct of their business, block
access to ticket windows, transportation facilities or other business
legitimately on the premises. Petitioners were not noisy, they created
no disturbance, and [they] did not harass patrons who did not wish to
hear what they had to say. Had petitioners in any way interfered with
the conduct of the railroad business, they could legitimately have been
asked to leave. 165

By incorporating the interference test into the Pruneyard analysis,
the courts would properly balance the speech and property interests
protected under California's Constitution. The interference test would
shift the burden of proof in public-forum cases to those property owners
who wish to block efforts to inform the public about important issues.
The way the Trader Joe's court conducted the Pruneyard analysis
requires citizens attempting to stimulate dialogue to bear the burden of
providing sufficient evidence that they have the right to engage in freespeech activities on a particular piece of private property.166 The
1621d.
163
164

In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d at 851.
Id. The court implied that the threshold test for finding a public forum is unlikely to have

been met if the railroad companies had only aHowed ticket-holders to enter the station.
165 In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d at 851.
166 See Trader Joe's Co. v. Progressive Campaigns, Inc., 73 Cal. App. 4th 425,434 (1999)
("The Pruneyard court's conclusion that the societal interest in using shopping centers as forums for
expressive activity outweighed the property interests of the shopping center owner was supported by
tangible evidence that shopping centers were supplanting central business districts as the preferred
public forum, i.e., the place where people chose to come and meet and talk and spend time. In
contrast, in the present case there is absolutely no evidence in any of appeHants' declarations that the
Santa Rosa Trader Joe's has assumed a comparable role. Thus, in contrast to the shopping center
discussed in Pruneyard, the Santa Rosa Trader Joe's is not a public forum uniquely suitable as a
place to exercise free speech and petitioning rights.").
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interference test instead would presume that under California's
Constitution free-speech activities are protected on private property
voluntarily made open to the public. Free-speech activities would be
allowed unless the property owner could demonstrate to a court that the
free-speech activities would unreasonably interfere with their preferred
use of the property. 167
Property-rights advocates might argue that this new test would harm
small shopkeepers who would be forced to tolerate political rallies or
petition gatherers who annoy their customers and hurt their business.
However, if a property owner can provide credible evidence to a court
demonstrating that free-speech activity would impede the free movement
of customers, result in harassment of patrons, or create an excessive
noise or disturbance, under the interference test that property would not
be considered a public forum. 168 Moreover, as has been the case since
Pruneyard, property owners would continue to be allowed to impose
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on all free-speech
activity.169 However, when they choose to open up their private property
and issue an invitation to the public, property owners in California
become bound to respect the broad free-speech rights guaranteed by
California's Constitution and affirmed by the state high court in Fashion
Valley Mall. 170
III. CONCLUSION
U.S. Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens noted that our
nation's founding fathers considered the freedom of speech to be at the
heart of the "secret of happiness.,,171 In light of the Fashion Valley Mall
court's affirmation of the greater free-speech protections embodied in the

167 One example of the kind of "interference" with the preferred use of their property that a
property owner could potentially show is that free-speech activities would interrupt the functioning
of the property owner's business by discouraging patrons from entering the store. See generally In
re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d at 851.
168 This follows the Court's description of the interference test in In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d at
851.
169 Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. NLRB, 42 Cal. 4th 850, 870 (2007).
170 Fashion Valley Mall, 42 Cal. 4th 850.
111 Justice John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293, \312 (1993)
("Those who won our independence believed ... liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to
be the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think
are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and
assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate
protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an
inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle
of the American government.").
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California Constitution, lower courts must take a fresh look at whether
those protections safeguard citizen speech on the property of stand-alone
stores. The courts shoulder a weighty burden to strike the right balance
under California's Constitution between the competing values of free
speech and property rights. 172
As California courts address the question whether stores such as
Target and Trader Joe's qualify as public forums for free-speech
purposes, they must acknowledge the Fashion Valley Mall court's clear
affirmation of Pruneyard. In doing so, courts should continue to allow
property owners to maximize the use of their property by enforcing
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on free-speech activities.
However, courts should presume that free-speech activities on property
that the owner has voluntarily opened to the public are constitutionally
protected. This presumption means that courts should place the burden
of proof on those wishing to restrict speech, not on those wishing to
speak. If a property owner can demonstrate that particular free-speech
activities would unreasonably interfere with the owner's use of the
property, a court should allow those free-speech activities to be
prohibited. Otherwise, following Fashion Valley Mall, the California
Constitution's liberty clause must be broadly construed to protect free
speech on private property because the "freedom to think as you will and
to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and
spread of political truth .... ,,173

JON GOLINGER'

172 Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal. 3d 899, 908 (1979), affd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980)
("To protect free speech and petitioning is a goal that surely matches the protecting of health and
safety, the environment, aesthetics, property values, and other societal goals that have been held to
justify reasonable restrictions on property rights.").
173 Justice John Paul Stevens, The Freedom o/Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293, 1312 (1993) .
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